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INTRODUCTION
Law-makers across the nation have enacted various options to expand school
choice.1 School choice, an idea largely promulgated by economist Milton Friedman,2 is a movement that focuses on “affording parents the right to choose which
school their child attends.”3 These initiatives have taken the form of charter
schools,4 school vouchers,5 scholarship tax credits,6 and lately education savings
accounts.7 In 2015, Nevada Governor Brian Sandoval signed into law the nation’s first universal education savings account program created by Nevada Senate Bill 302 (“S.B. 302”).8 Known as Education Savings Accounts (“ESAs”), the
program allows eligible students to receive a state-funded grant to be used toward
education outside the public school system, such as in a private school and for
other private education expenditures.9 Proponents argue that the program will

1

School Choice and Charters, NAT’L CONFERENCE OF STATE LEGISLATURES,
http://www.ncsl.org/research/education/school-choice-and-charters.aspx [https://perma.cc/Q
A2B-ULWX] (last visited Apr. 25, 2017).
2
See Jon Hartley & Alex Verkhivker, School Choice and Nevada’s Revolutionary Education
Savings Accounts, FORBES (June 30, 2015, 1:51 PM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/jonhartley/2015/06/30/school-choice-and-nevadas-revolutionary-education-savings-accounts/#7190
a6852aa2 [https://perma.cc/Z5A4-N9JP].
3
Choice, EDUC. WEEK (Aug. 3, 2004), http://www.edweek.org/ew/issues/choice/ [https://per
ma.cc/425P-5SLX].
4
Josh Cunningham, Charter Schools, NAT’L CONFERENCE OF STATE LEGISLATURES,
http://www.ncsl.org/research/education/charter-schools-overview.aspx [https://perma.cc/9FV
2-HEWY] (last visited Apr. 25, 2017) (explaining that charter schools are essentially public
schools that enroll students based on parental choice and are privately managed by an organization).
5
Josh Cunningham, Private School Choice, NAT’L CONFERENCE OF STATE LEGISLATURES,
(Mar. 22, 2015), http://www.ncsl.org/research/education/private-school-choice635174504.as
px [https://perma.cc/7DFL-D2HJ] (“School vouchers are state-funded scholarships that pay
for students to attend private school rather than public school.”).
6
Id. (“Scholarship tax credits allow individuals and corporations to allocate a portion of their
owed state taxes to private nonprofit scholarship organizations that issue public and private
school scholarships to K-12 students.”).
7
Id. (“Education Savings Accounts are state-funded grants deposited into special savings
accounts from which parents can withdraw funds for certain educational expenses.”).
8
Jonathan Butcher, Opinion, Nevada’s Education Gambit, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP. (June
17, 2015, 12:45 PM), https://www.usnews.com/opinion/knowledge-bank/2015/06/17/nevadas-new-education-savings-accounts-will-give-parents-lots-of-options
[https://perma.cc/8CQ3-FXNH]. See generally S.B. 302, 2015 Leg., 78th Sess. (Nev. 2015).
9
Josh Cunningham, Nevada Enacts Nation’s Most Expansive School Choice Program, NAT’L
CONFERENCE OF STATE LEGISLATURES BLOG (June 10, 2015), http://www.ncsl.org/blog/2015/
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provide parents with choice and increase competition between private and public
schools, resulting in a better education system.10 On the other hand, opponents
argue that it will strip funding from public schools that desperately need it, which
by some preliminary estimates could amount to as much as $40 million.11 Furthermore, opponents argue that the program is unconstitutional because it impedes the duties of the State under the Nevada Constitution by funneling money
to religiously affiliated private schools that engage in discriminatory practices
based on things like religion and sexual orientation.12
Shortly after Nevada passed the program, opponents challenged it on these
constitutional grounds, culminating before the Nevada Supreme Court in
Schwartz v. Lopez.13 On September 29, 2016, the Court issued a unanimous decision striking down the ESAs’ funding mechanism as an impermissible appropriation and determined that the ESAs were facially constitutional under Article
XI, Section 2 of the Nevada State Constitution.14 However, the justices in a fourto-two majority decision also determined that the ESAs were facially constitutional under Article XI, Section 10 of the Nevada State Constitution.15 This decision resulted in both sides hailing victory, headlines reading “Nevada’s School
Choice Victory,”16 “Nevada Supreme Court Strikes Down School Choice Funding Method,”17 and “Education Savings Accounts Dead But Not Buried.”18 This
Article will analyze and discuss the Nevada Supreme Court’s holding in
Schwartz v. Lopez and its implications for the State of Nevada. Part I provides a
brief background and explanation of the ESA program. Part II explains the background and holding of the principal case Schwartz v. Lopez. Part III then analyzes
the holding in light of other states’ jurisprudence, dissects the Court’s reasoning,

06/10/nevada-enacts-nations-most-expansive-school-choice-program.aspx [https://perma.cc/
3R9V-MA8F].
10
Neal Morton, Cost Reaches $545K for Nevada in Education Savings Account Challenge,
L.V. REV.-J. (Aug. 9, 2016, 6:02 PM), http://www.reviewjournal.com/news/education/costreaches-545k-nevada-education-savings-account-challenge [https://perma.cc/J2RZ-7NMD].
11
Id.
12
See id.
13
Schwartz. v. Lopez, 382 P.3d 886, 891 (Nev. 2016).
14
See id.
15
See id.
16
Allysia Finley, Opinion, Nevada’s School Choice Victory: Unions Lose Their Attempt to
Kill Education Savings Accounts, WALL ST. J. (Sept. 29, 2016, 7:40 PM), http://www.wsj.com/
articles/nevadas-school-choice-victory-1475192404 [https://perma.cc/B7SP-DN4X].
17
Sandra Chereb, Nevada Supreme Court Strikes Down School Choice Funding Method, L.V.
REV.-J. (Sept. 29, 2016, 6:26 PM), http://www.reviewjournal.com/news/education/nevada-supreme-court-strikes-down-school-choice-funding-method [https://perma.cc/843L-G5G8].
18
Joe Schoenmann, Education Savings Accounts Dead but Not Buried, KNPR (Sept. 30,
2016), http://knpr.org/knpr/2016-09/education-savings-accounts-dead-not-buried [https://per
ma.cc/82WP-H4DB].
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and determines how this precedent should be interpreted moving forward. Finally, the Article concludes by summarizing the Article’s findings and predicts
the fate of Nevada’s ESAs.
I.   NEVADA’S EDUCATION SAVINGS ACCOUNTS
A.   Background
On March 16, 2015, Republican State Senator Scott Hammond introduced
S.B. 302, which set forth a plan for Nevada to be the first state to create a universal ESA program. The Senate and Assembly passed S.B. 302 on a party-line
vote, and Governor Sandoval signed the bill into law on June 2, 2015.19 Nevada’s
ESAs have been called one of “the nation’s most aggressive school choice program[s].”20 There are four other states that offer some type of ESA program;21
however, each of these ESA programs is limited to certain types of students. For
example, Arizona offers them to students with disabilities, in foster care, or in
low-performing schools;22 and Florida, Tennessee, and Mississippi limit them to
students with disabilities.23 Unlike ESA programs in other states, S.B. 302 provides ESAs to all public school students regardless of socioeconomic status, and,
as enacted, it had no budget or enrollment caps.24
B.   Nevada’s Education Savings Accounts: How They Work
In Nevada, students ages seven through eighteen years old qualify for the
ESA program, as long as they were enrolled in a public school for 100 consecutive days before applying for ESA funds.25 While all students who fall under the
100-day requirement, or one of its exceptions,26 are eligible for ESA funding, the
19

See S.B. 302 Overview, NELIS NEV. LEGISLATURE, https://www.leg.state.nv.us/App/NEL
IS/REL/78th2015/Bill/1857/Overview [https://perma.cc/D2VB-ZACN] (last visited Apr. 25,
2017).
20
E.g., Eric Schulzke, The Nation’s Most Aggressive School Choice Program Has Cleared at
Least One Hurdle, DESERET NEWS (May 22, 2016, 6:00 AM), http://www.deseretnews.com/article/865654713/Nevada-judge-upholds-Education-Savings-Accounts-program.html [https://perma.cc/P962-KPHU]; see also Rob Taylor, Headlines on School Law, 24
SCH. L. FOR PRINCIPALS, November 2015, at 1.
21
See Josh Cunningham, The Next Generation of School Vouchers: Education Savings Accounts, NAT’L CONFERENCE OF STATE LEGISLATURES (Aug. 18, 2016), http://www.ncsl.org/research/education/the-next-generation-of-school-vouchers-education-savings-accounts.aspx
[https://perma.cc/6SYH-Z44M].
22
Id.
23
Id.
24
Cunningham, supra note 9.
25
Id.; see S.B. 302, 2015 Leg., 78th Sess. § 7 (Nev. 2015).
26
Private school and homeschooled students are not included in S.B. 302’s “count day” component. See DAN SCHWARTZ, EDUCATION SAVINGS ACCOUNT: PARENT HANDBOOK 5 (2016)
[hereinafter ESA PARENT HANDBOOK]. Thus, these students would technically be ineligible to
participate in the program. See id. However, the Nevada State Treasurer’s office offered two
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percentage of funds awarded to each student varies.27 Students with disabilities28
or students from families whose household incomes are less than 185 percent of
the federal poverty line are eligible to receive 100 percent of per-pupil funds29
rather than the standard 90 percent.30 In addition, non-traditional public school
students, such as those students who are not enrolled in a full-time schedule, may
receive pro-rated funding.31 Eligibility for all qualified students is valid for one
school year and subject to either early termination or renewal for the upcoming
school year.32
The Nevada State Treasurer administers the program by setting up electronic
individual “savings accounts” through a third party.33 As enacted, the amounts to
be credited to each individual ESA would be funded from the State’s Distributive
School Account (“DSA”) with deductions from each school district’s DSA distribution.34 To participate in the program, eligible children’s parents must submit
exceptions to the one-hundred-day rule policy, allowing children between the ages of five and
seven and children of active-duty military students to participate. Id.
27
S.B. 302 § 8.
28
“Pupil with a disability” as defined by NEV. REV. STAT. § 388.417(7) (2016).
29
Funding of education is determined by “The Nevada Plan . . . a statewide, formula-based
funding mechanism for public K-12 education.” FISCAL ANALYSIS DIV., LEGISLATIVE
COUNSEL BUREAU, THE NEVADA PLAN FOR SCHOOL FINANCE: AN OVERVIEW 6 (2015),
https://www.leg.state.nv.us/Division/fiscal/NevadaPlan/Nevada_Plan.pdf
[https://perma.cc/AQR2-XLLE]. Under this plan, the State develops a guaranteed amount of
funding for each local school district. Id. at 7. The guaranteed funding is provided by both
state and local sources and contributes 75–80 percent of school district resources. Id. “To determine the level of guaranteed funding . . . a basic per-pupil support amount for each district
is established in law each legislative session.” Id. (emphasis added).
30
S.B. 302 § 8; ESA PARENT HANDBOOK, supra note 26, at 7.
31
ESA PARENT HANDBOOK, supra note 26, at 5; see also Thomas W. Stewart & Brittany
Walker, Nevada’s Education Savings Accounts: A Constitutional Analysis, NEV. SUP. CT.
SUMMARIES, 7–8 (2016). “For instance, if a child is enrolled one [sic] class in the public school
system, they are eligible to receive one-sixth of the calculated ESA amount.” Id. at 8, n.55.
32
S.B. 302 § 7.
33
Id.
34
See id. § 16; discussion supra note 29. See generally NEV. REV. STAT. § 387.121 (2016)
The school district’s DSA distribution is the amount that the state distributes to each school
district from the State of Nevada’s General Fund to fund the per-pupil guarantee calculated
each biennium under the Nevada Plan of school finance.
The Legislature declares that the proper objective of state financial aid to public education is to
ensure each Nevada child a reasonably equal educational opportunity. Recognizing wide local
variations in wealth and costs per pupil, this State should supplement local financial ability to
whatever extent necessary in each school district to provide programs of instruction in both compulsory and elective subjects that offer full opportunity for every Nevada child to receive the benefit of the purposes for which public schools are maintained. Therefore, the quintessence of the
State’s financial obligation for such programs can be expressed in a formula partially on a perpupil basis and partially on a per-program basis as: State financial aid to school districts equals
the difference between school district basic support guarantee and local available funds produced
by mandatory taxes minus all the local funds attributable to pupils who reside in the county but
attend a charter school or a university school for profoundly gifted pupils. This formula is designated the Nevada Plan.
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an application to the Nevada State Treasurer.35 Upon approval, parents must then
enter and sign an agreement, which requires that: (1) a participating entity in
Nevada will educate the child; (2) the Nevada State Treasurer will deposit the
money awarded into individual savings accounts; (3) the parents will spend the
money according to the established grant regulations; and (4) the money will be
inaccessible during breaks in the school year.36 The Treasurer funds ESAs on a
quarterly basis, and parents may apply for ESAs only during specific open-enrollment periods.37 When the Treasurer places funds in an ESA, the State then
deducts the funds from the child’s resident school district.38 For the funds to
reach a child’s ESA, the child must dis-enroll from his or her public school at
least one day prior to disbursement.39
Families may spend ESA funds only with “participating entities.”40 S.B. 302
defines a “participating entity” as: (1) “[a] private school licensed pursuant to
chapter 394 of NRS or exempt from such licensing pursuant to NRS 394.211”;
(2) “[a]n eligible institution”; (3) “[a] program of distance education that is not
operated by a public school or the Department [of Education]”; (4) “[an accredited] tutor or tutoring facility”; or (5) “[t]he parent of a child.”41 To become participating entities, schools must apply to the Treasurer.42 Each year, the Treasurer
provides a list of participating entities for eligible ESA students.43 Parents may
use the ESA funds for various educational purposes, including tuition, fees, textbooks, tutoring, curriculum, and supplies.44 “Tuition” is defined as money
“charged by private schools, distance education programs and eligible institutions,” such as community colleges.45
Although S.B. 302 does not speak in logistical terms as to how participating
entities receive payments of tuition, the Nevada State Treasurer has developed
regulations and made ESA guides available for both parents and participating
entities on the Nevada State Treasurer’s website.46 According to the “Participating Entity Handbook,” an entity may receive payment through the Nevada State
Treasurer’s website portal by either requesting payment from the parent or by

Id.
35

S.B. 302 § 7.
Id.
37
See id. § 8.
38
See id. § 16.
39
See ESA PARENT HANDBOOK, supra note 26, at 8.
40
S.B. 302 § 9.
41
Id. § 11.
42
Id.
43
Id. § 13.
44
ESA PARENT HANDBOOK, supra note 26, at 8.
45
Id.
46
Education Savings Account, NEV. STATE TREASURER, http://www.nevadatreasurer.gov/
SchoolChoice/Home/ [https://perma.cc/MB5Q-EV3A] (last visited Apr. 26, 2017).
36

17 NEV. L.J. 805 WALKER - FINAL.DOCX

Summer 2017]

EDUCATION SAVINGS ACCOUNTS

5/10/17 3:28 PM

811

the parent requesting to make a payment.47 The payment is completed when either the parent accepts the entity’s request for payment or the entity accepts payment from the parent.48 For other expenses such as fees, textbooks, transportation, and educational therapies, parents must pay costs upfront and then apply for
reimbursement from the child’s ESA through the Nevada State Treasurer’s web
portal.49 Funds that remain in a child’s account at the end of the school year may
be rolled over to the next school year, as long as the child neither graduates nor
moves out of Nevada.50 Any funds that fail to qualify for roll-over are transferred
to the State General Fund.51
C.   Education Savings Accounts Controversy
The program faced controversy from its inception as opponents and proponents heavily debated the policy. During committee hearings, legislators expressed concerns that the funds would be misused,52 that public schools would
suffer, and that there would be a lack of accountability on the spending of public
funds.53 However, legislators in support of the program countered that ESAs
would allow children having trouble learning from the “cookie-cutter approach”
to find a school where they can succeed and that the money should be with the
child instead of the institution.54 There were also lobbyists on both sides of the
issue. Joyce Haldeman, lobbyist for the Clark County School District and former
superintendent, expressed concern over the Clark County School District’s ability to improve schools without adequate resources because S.B. 302 could cause
large financial losses.55 Victor Salcido, lobbyist for the Milton Friedman Foundation for Educational Choice, countered those concerns by claiming that the
program would solve over-crowding and give parents the ability to craft education to meet their child’s needs.56 Parents of public school kids also participated
47

DAN SCHWARTZ, EDUCATION SAVINGS ACCOUNT: PARTICIPATING ENTITY HANDBOOK 15
(2016) [hereinafter ESA PARTICIPATING ENTITY HANDBOOK] http://www.nevadatreasurer.gov/
uploadedFiles/nevadatreasurergov/content/SchoolChoice/Vendors/Participating_Entity_Han
dbook_ESA.pdf [https://perma.cc/LHP3-UKU4].
48
Id.
49
See id.
50
S.B. 302, 2015 Leg., 78th Sess. § 8 (Nev. 2015).
51
Id.
52
Hearing on S.B. 302 Before the Assemb. Comm. on Educ., 2015 Leg., 78th Sess. 12 (Nev.
2015) (statement of Assemb. Edgar Flores, Member, Assemb. Comm. on Educ.).
53
Id. at 13 (statement of Assemb Amber Joiner, Member, Assemb. Comm. on Educ.). Legislators were also concerned that the funds could be used for homeschooling because parents
were within the definition of a participating entity. See id. at 22 (statement of Assemb. Elliot
T. Anderson, Member, Assemb. Comm. on Educ.).
54
Id. at 16 (statement of Assemb. Chris Edwards, Member, Assemb. Comm. on Educ.).
55
Id. at 35 (statement of Joyce Haldeman, Associate Superintendent, Community and Government Relations, Clark County School District).
56
Id. at 26 (statement of Victor M. Salcido, Director of Policy and Strategy, Argentum Partners) (“We represent the Friedman Foundation for Educational Choice.”).
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in the debate, with some finding the program necessary. For example, one parent
believed that Nevada public schools failed her child with dyslexia and that this
program would help parents like her.57 Yet other parents weren’t convinced of
the program’s efficacy, stating that the “CCSD’s budget was insufficient to provide students with all the resources they need to succeed . . . [and] [d]iverting
money from a critically underfunded public education budget will only exacerbate our teacher shortage and performance crisis.”58 The parents in opposition
did not believe this type of program would actually succeed in its mission. This
is because S.B. 302 only provided ESAs with about $5,100 for traditional ESA
pupils and $5,900 for low-income ESA status pupils per year, and these amounts
would do little to help low- and middle-income families when the average annual
cost of private schools in Clark and Washoe counties is about $4,000 to $5,000
more than the allotted per-pupil dollar-value.59 Additionally, many people were
skeptical of the effectiveness of school choice programs in general.60
However, whether the ESAs are good policy for Nevada’s children was not
the issue presented before Nevada’s courts. In fact, several provisions of the Nevada Constitution could stand in the way of such a program.61 Article XI, Sections 1, 2, 6, and 10 respectively, state: “The legislature shall encourage by all
suitable means the promotion of intellectual, literary, scientific, mining, mechanical, agricultural, and moral improvements . . .”;62 “The legislature shall provide
for a uniform system of common schools, by which a school shall be established
and maintained in each school district at least six months in every year . . .”;63
“[T]he Legislature shall enact one or more appropriations to provide the money
the Legislature deems to be sufficient, when combined with the local money reasonably available for this purpose, to fund the operation of the public schools in
the State for kindergarten through grade 12 . . . [,]”64 and “[n]o public funds of
any kind or character whatever, State, County or Municipal, shall be used for

57

Id. at 27–28 (statement of Jennifer Hammond, Private Citizen, Henderson, Nevada).
See Electra McGrath-Skrzydlewski, Opinion, One View: Why I Am a Plaintiff in the Education Voucher Lawsuit, RENO GAZETTE-J. (July 26, 2016, 1:12 PM), http://www.rgj.com/stor
y/opinion/voices/2016/07/26/one-view-why-am-plaintiff-education-voucher-lawsuit/875811
96/ [https://perma.cc/97CU-ERTD].
59
E-mail from Educate Nevada Now, to ryanm@jeffwagneragency.com, https://t.e2ma.net/
message/xgldx/5u549l [https://perma.cc/B5UG-HKDA] (last visited Apr. 26, 2017).
60
See generally, e.g., Frederick M. Hess, Does School Choice “Work”?, NAT’L AFF., Fall
2010, at 35.
61
See Stewart & Walker, supra note 31, at 10–11.
62
NEV. CONST. art. XI, § 1; see also What Does the Nevada Constitution Require?, EDUCATE
NEVADA NOW, http://www.educatenevadanow.com/initiatives/nevadas-esa-voucher-program/educate-nevada-now-faqs/ [https://perma.cc/VE7C-MX73] (last visited Apr. 26, 2017).
63
NEV. CONST. art. XI, § 2; see also What does the Nevada Constitution Require?, supra note
62.
64
NEV. CONST. art. XI, § 6; see also E-mail from Educate Nevada Now, supra note 59.
58
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sectarian purpose.”65 With these constitutional provisions seemingly imposing a
duty on the State to provide for a public education system and to exclude sectarian, or religious, purpose, the question for Nevada’s courts to decide was
whether such a program unconstitutionally funds and creates a state-supported
network of private religious schools.66
II.   THE PRINCIPAL CASE
Shortly after S.B. 302’s passage, Nevada’s ESAs were challenged on two
separate constitutional grounds, in two separate cases: Lopez v. Schwartz67 and
Duncan v. State.68
A.   Lopez v. Schwartz69
In Lopez, plaintiffs were seven parents of Nevada public school children
who, through counsel,70 argued that S.B. 302 violated Article XI, Sections 2, 3,
6.1 and 6.2 of the Nevada Constitution.71 Plaintiffs subsequently filed a motion
for preliminary injunction, and, on January 11, 2016, Judge James E. Wilson held
that the plaintiff parents clearly showed S.B. 302 violated Article XI, Sections
6.1 and 6.2 but that the parents did not clearly show that S.B. 302 facially violated

65

NEV. CONST. art. XI, § 10; Neal Morton, ACLU Sues to Stop Nevada Education Savings
Accounts, L.V. REV.-J. (Aug. 27, 2015), https://www.reviewjournal.com/news/education/ac
lu-sues-to-stop-nevada-education-savings-accounts/ [https://perma.cc/X53Z-WWBL].
66
Morton, supra note 65 (quoting Tod Story, Exec. Dir., Am. Civ. Liberties Union of Nev.)
(“The education savings account law passed this last legislative session tears down the wall
separating church and state erected in Nevada’s constitution”; and quoting Sylvia Lazos, Policy Dir., Educate Nev. Now, “drawing money out of traditional school districts and using that
for private education contradicts a constitutional requirement that lawmakers ‘sufficiently’
fund public schools. . . . We’re going to use public funds to subsidize and basically finance a
system that is not uniform.”).
67
Order Granting Motion for Preliminary Injunction, Lopez v. Schwartz, No. 15-0C-002071B (1st Jud. Dist. Ct. Nev. Jan. 11, 2016).
68
Order on Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Jurisdiction and Failure to State a
Claim, Duncan v. State, No. A-15-723703-C (Dist. Ct. Nev. May 18, 2016).
69
Order Granting Motion for Preliminary Injunction, supra note 67.
70
Plaintiffs were supported by Educate Nevada Now, which is affiliated with The Rogers
Foundation, pro bono lead attorney Tamerlin Godley from Munger, Tolles & Olson, LLP,
local pro bono counsel (Bradley Schrager, Don Springmeyer, and Justin Jones with Wolf,
Rifkin, Shapiro, Schulman & Rabkin, LLP), and David Sciarra from the Education Law Center
in New Jersey. See Notice of Entry of Order Granting Motion for Preliminary Injunction,
Lopez v. Schwartz, No. 15-0C-00207-1B (1st Jud. Dist. Ct. Nev. Jan. 12, 2016); see Press
Release, Educ. Law Ctr., Public School Parents to State Treasurer: Obey Court Order, Stop
ESA Program, (Dec. 5, 2016), http://www.edlawcenter.org/news/archives/nevada/publicschool-parents-to-state-treasurer-obey-court-order,-stop-esa-program.html [https://perma.cc/
8Z4X-655V].
71
See Order Granting Motion for Preliminary Injunction, supra note 67, at 2.
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Sections 2 or 3.72 Judge Wilson also held that the plaintiffs had met all requirements for a preliminary injunction, and it was granted.73 The State Treasurer appealed.74
B.   Duncan v. State75
In Duncan, the plaintiffs were five Nevada citizens who, through counsel,76
challenged S.B. 302 on the grounds that it violated Article XI, Sections 2 and 10
of the Nevada State Constitution.77 The State of Nevada filed a motion to dismiss
for lack of jurisdiction and failure to state a claim, and the district court found
that plaintiffs did have standing as taxpayers to facially challenge S.B. 302
against Article XI, Sections 2 and 10 of the Nevada Constitution.78 However, the
court found that the plaintiffs lacked standing to assert specific applied injuries,
including the possibility of lost public school funding, as they had not personally
suffered any harm.79 Consequently, the district court held that S.B. 302 does not
facially violate Article XI, Sections 2 or 10 and, thus, granted the State of Nevada’s motion to dismiss.80 The plaintiffs appealed.81

72

Id.
Id.
74
The State of Nevada was represented by Attorney General Adam Paul Laxalt, Solicitor
General Lawrence VanDyke, Deputy Solicitor General Joseph Tartakovsky, Head of Complex
Litigation Ketan Bhirud, and Paul D. Clement with Bancroft PLLC. See Defendant’s Notice
of Appeal at 2, Lopez. v. Schwartz, No. 15-0C-00207-1B (1st Jud. Dist. Ct. Nev. Jan. 15,
2016) (No. 69611).
75
Order on Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Jurisdiction and Failure to State a
Claim, supra note 68, at 1.
76
The plaintiffs in Duncan were supported by Amy M. Rose with the American Civil Liberties
Union (ACLU) of Nevada, Daniel Mach, Heather L. Weaver with the ACLU Foundation,
Richard B. Katskee and Gregory M. Lipper with Americans United for Separation of Church
and State, and Nitin Subhedar, Samuel Jacob Edwards, and Anupam Sharma with Covington
& Burlington, LLP. Plaintiffs’ Order Admitting to Practice, Duncan v. State, No. A-15723703-C (Dist. Ct. Nev. Apr. 8, 2016).
77
See Order on Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Jurisdiction and Failure to State
a Claim, supra note 68, at 2.
78
See id. at 18. The State of Nevada was represented by Attorney General Adam Paul Laxalt,
Solicitor General Lawrence VanDyke, Deputy Solicitor General Joseph Tartakovsky, General
Counsel Ketan Bhirud, Assistant Solicitor General Jordan T. Smith, and Paul D. Clement with
Bancroft PLLC. See Notice of Entry of Order at 2, Duncan v. State, No. A-15-723703-C (Dist.
Ct. Nev. June 1, 2016).
79
Order on Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Jurisdiction and Failure to State a
Claim, supra note 68, at 19.
80
Id. at 29, 44–45.
81
See Notice of Appeal at 1, Duncan v. State, No. A-15-723703-C (Dist. Ct. Nev. June 17,
2016).
73
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C.   Schwartz v. Lopez
The Nevada Supreme Court acknowledged that while two separate complaints were filed challenging the constitutionality of S.B. 302, both complaints
shared common legal questions and thus warranted a joint resolution.82 The Court
emphasized that S.B. 302’s merits and policy were not before the Court, and the
judiciary’s role was solely to determine whether the legislation was contrary to
Nevada’s constitution.83 As a threshold matter, the Court first analyzed the State
of Nevada’s argument that “the [Duncan] plaintiffs lack[ed] standing to challenge S.B. 302 because they cannot show that they will suffer any special injury”;
and recognized that “[g]enerally, a party must show a personal injury and not
merely a general interest that is common to all members of the public.”84 However, the Court adopted a new exception to the injury requirement when there are
“issues of significant public importance,” and available only when certain narrow criteria are met.85 Therefore, the Duncan plaintiffs met the standing requirement under the new public-importance exception test.86
Next, the Court analyzed the plaintiffs’ constitutional claims. While the
Court recognized that the cases came before the Court through different procedural contexts, both of the lower courts’ decisions concerned S.B. 302’s constitutionality; thus, the Court held that these questions were reviewable under a de
novo standard since they were purely questions of legal interpretation.87 The
Court analyzed whether S.B. 302 is constitutional under three sections of Article
XI of Nevada’s Constitution: (1) Section 2, the “uniformity” clause;88 (2) Section
10, the “no-aid” clause;89 and (3) Section 6, the “education-first” clause.90

82

Schwartz v. Lopez, 382 P.3d 886, 891 (Nev. 2016).
Id.
84
Id. at 894.
85
Id.; see, e.g., Trs. for Alaska v. State, 736 P.2d 324, 329–30 (Alaska 1987); see Dep’t of
Admin. v. Horne, 269 So. 2d 659, 662–63 (Fla. 1972); Utah Chapter of Sierra Club v. Utah
Air Quality Bd., 148 P.3d 960, 972–74 (Utah 2006).
86
Schwartz, 332 P.3d at 895.
87
Id.
88
Leslie Hiner, Educational Choice for Nevada Public School Students Threatened by Lawsuit, ED CHOICE BLOG (Aug. 27, 2015), https://www.edchoice.org/blog/educational-choice-f
or-nevada-public-school-students-threatened-by-lawsuit/ [https://perma.cc/CV3S-QC85] (referring to Section 2 as the “Uniformity Clause”).
89
Id. (referring to Section 10 as the “No-Aid Clause”).
90
Press Release, Educate Nev. Now, Parents’ Challenge to ESA Voucher Law Remains on
Track Before Nevada Supreme Court (May 19, 2016), http://www.educatenevadanow.com/
press_release/parents-challenge-to-esa-voucher-law-remains-on-track-before-nevada-supre
me-court/ [https://perma.cc/Q27Q-5JBT] (referring to Article XI, Section 6 as the “Education
First Amendment”). See generally, Schwartz, 332 P.3d at 900.
83
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1.   Article XI, Section 2
First, the Court analyzed whether S.B. 302 violated the uniformity clause,
found in Article XI, Section 2 of the Nevada Constitution. It states:
The legislature shall provide for a uniform system of common schools, by which
a school shall be established and maintained in each school district at least six
months in every year, and any school district which shall allow instruction of a
sectarian character therein may be deprived of its proportion of the interest of the
public school fund during such neglect or infraction, and the legislature may pass
such laws as will tend to secure a general attendance of the children in each school
district upon said public schools.91

Plaintiffs in both Duncan and Lopez argued that S.B. 302 violated the uniformity
clause in Section 2 because it used public funds to subsidize an alternative nonuniform private system of education.92 To support their position, plaintiffs cited
to the long-recognized maxim expressio unius est exclusio alterius, meaning the
expression of one thing is the exclusion of another, and they argued that the constitutional mandate to provide a uniform system of public schools forbids the
legislature from creating a coexisting system of private schools.93 The State repudiated that doctrine by insisting that the term “uniform” meant consistency
within the public school system itself and that Section 2 must be read in conjunction with Section 1, which “require[s] the Legislature to encourage education ‘by
all suitable means.’ ”94 The State argued that Section 1’s “‘suitable means
clause’” gives the legislature broad education policy-making powers, and, thus,
policy makers are not confined to public education.95 Plaintiffs refuted that position by stating that the suitable-means clause was intended only to allow the legislature to encourage education within the public school system itself.96
The Court stated that the uniformity clause’s plain language is “clearly directed at maintaining uniformity within the public school system” and determined that S.B. 302 is not contrary to Section 2’s uniformity mandate because it
does not transform private schools into public schools.97 In addition, the State’s
91

NEV. CONST. art. XI, § 2.
Schwartz, 332 P.3d at 896; see also Respondents’ Answering Brief at 38, Schwartz, 332
P.3d (No. 69611); Appellants’ Opening Brief at 48–49, Duncan v. State, No. A-15-723703-C
(No. 70648) (Nev. July 12, 2016).
93
Schwartz, 382 P.3d at 896; see also Thomas v. Nevada Yellow Cab Corp., 327 P.3d 518,
521 (Nev. 2014); Galloway v. Truesdell, 422 P.2d 237, 246 (Nev. 1967); Appellants’ Opening
Brief, supra note 92, at 48–49.
94
NEV. CONST. art. 11, § 1 (“The legislature shall encourage by all suitable means the promotion of intellectual, literary, scientific, mining, mechanical, agricultural, and moral improvements, and also provide for a superintendent of public instruction and by law prescribe the
manner of appointment, term of office and the duties thereof.”); Schwartz, 382 P.3d at 896–
97.
95
Schwartz, 382 P.3d at 896.
96
Id. at 897.
97
NEV. CONST. art. 11, § 1; Schwartz, 382 P.3d at 896.
92
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Section 1 argument also persuaded the Court in determining that the use of the
phrase “and also” signaled two legislative duties: to encourage education and to
provide for a superintendent of public instruction.98 The Court analogized this
interpretation to the case of Meredith v. Pence, where the Indiana Supreme Court
upheld a similar program under Indiana’s uniformity clause.99 The Nevada Supreme Court also adopted the Meredith court’s interpretation of the uniformschools requirement stating that “as long as the Legislature maintains a uniform
public school system, open and available to all students, the constitutional mandate . . . is satisfied.”100 The plaintiffs’ reliance on the Florida case of Bush v.
Holmes,101 which struck down a similar school choice program, was dismissed
on the basis that Florida’s constitutional provision was “inapposite.”102 In addition, the Court believed there was support for the parental freedom view in the
debates during Nevada’s constitutional convention.103 Therefore, the Court held
that S.B. 302 is facially constitutional under Article XI, Section 2 of the Nevada
Constitution.104

98

Schwartz, 382 P.3d at 897 (“interpreting use of the word ‘and’ in the Indiana constitution’s
education clause as setting forth two separate and distinct duties”); see also Meredith v. Pence,
984 N.E.2d 1213, 1221 (Ind. 2013).
99
Schwartz, 382 P.3d at 897. Indiana’s uniform schools section specifically requires the legislature “to provide, by law, for a general and uniform system of Common Schools, wherein
tuition shall be without charge, and equally open to all.” See IND. CONST. art. 8, § 1.
100
Schwartz, 382 P.3d at 898.
101
Id.
102
Id.; see also Bush v. Holmes, 919 So. 2d 392, 407 (Fla. 2006); FL. CONST. of 1868, art. IX,
§ 2 (“The legislature shall provide a uniform system of common schools, and a university, and
shall provide for the liberal maintenance of the same. Instruction in them shall be free.”).
103
Schwartz, 382 P.3d at 897; see, e.g., OFFICIAL REPORT OF THE DEBATES AND PROCEEDINGS
IN THE CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION OF THE STATE OF NEVADA 565–77 (1864). The Delegates
were most concerned with the language requiring compulsory public school attendance as it
seemed contrary to the spirit of the American republic. Id. at 571 (statement of J.H. Warwick,
Lander County). However, it is also important to note that the delegates also believed that
“there should be some provision by which the children of the State, growing up to be men and
women, should have the privilege secured to them of attending school . . . .” Id. at 567 (statement of John A. Collins, Storey County). As a result, the language was modified to encourage
educational instruction as a whole, rather than mandatory attendance in the public schools. Id.
at 574 (statement of James A. Banks, Humboldt County). The Delegates settled on the language of Section 2 anticipating that future interpretations would evolve with the times. Id. at
573–74 (statement of James A. Banks, Humboldt County) (John A. Collins, Storey County
noting that “[t]he provision is elastic and comprehensive, and may be adapted to any want of
any particular portion of the community, or any condition of progress of the public mind”).
104
Schwartz, 382 P.3d. at 898–99.
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2.   Article XI, Section 10
Next, the Court in Schwartz v. Lopez analyzed whether S.B. 302 was an impermissible use of public funds under the no-aid clause found in Article XI, Section 10 of the Nevada Constitution.105 Section 10 states that “[n]o public funds
of any kind or character whatever, State, County or Municipal, shall be used for
sectarian purpose.”106 S.B. 302 allows public funds to be deposited into an account set up by a parent on a child’s behalf, and those funds may be used only
for certain education expenses, including, but not limited to, tuition at a participating religious private school.107 Plaintiffs in Duncan argued that this use of
public monies was a sectarian purpose, relying on Nevada’s only interpretation
of the “no aid” clause in the 1882 Nevada Supreme Court decision of State v.
Hallock.108
In Hallock, the Nevada Supreme Court ruled that legislative funding of a
Catholic orphanage asylum was impermissible under Section 10109 and used the
“popular sense” definition of the term “sectarian,” which broadly provides that a
“religious sect is a body or number of persons united in tenets, but constituting a
distinct organization or party.”110 Additionally, the Nevada Supreme Court in
Hallock rejected the argument that funds would not be used for sectarian purposes because the Court determined that it would be “impossible to separate the
legitimate use from that which is forbidden.”111 The plaintiffs analogized the use
of ESA program funds in religious institutions to the funding of the orphanage
struck down by the Hallock Court.112 However, the State argued that ESA program had a secular purpose, to promote education for all of Nevada’s students.113
Furthermore, the State set forth that the public funds are provided “only to parents, not schools,” claiming that the intervening decisions of parents break any
link between public funds being used for sectarian purposes.114 Plaintiffs refuted
this position by arguing that the funds never lost their public identity because
they are always subject to state control, citing to the State Treasurer’s authority

105

Id. at 899.
NEV. CONST. art 11, § 10.
107
Schwartz, 382 P.3d at 899.
108
See Appellants’ Opening Brief, supra note 92, at 20; State v. Hallock, 16 Nev. 373, 386,
388 (1882).
109
Hallock, 16 Nev. at 388.
110
See id. at 385; see also Jay S. Bybee & David W. Newton, Of Orphans and Vouchers:
Nevada’s “Little Blaine Amendment” and the Future of Religious Participation in Public Programs, 2 NEV. L.J. 551, 569 (2002).
111
Hallock, 16 Nev. at 388; Bybee & Newton, supra note 110, at 570. In Hallock, the Nevada
Supreme Court interpreted Section 10 as a bar upon the legislature from funding sectarian
institutions even when the funds were used for secular purposes. Hallock, 16 Nev. at 388.
112
See Appellants’ Opening Brief, supra note 92, at 20–24.
113
See Respondents’ Answering Brief, supra note 92, at 20.
114
Id. at 26.
106
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to audit the accounts, to freeze the funds for misuse, and to automatically revert
unused funds back to the State’s General Fund.115
The Court was persuaded by the State’s interpretation and disagreed with the
plaintiffs’ reading of Hallock.116 Since the Hallock decision concerned a direct
appropriation to a sectarian institution and since S.B. 302 appropriates funds to
parents, who are private individuals, the “holding in Hallock d[id] not require a
different conclusion.”117 Further, the Court disagreed that the funds were being
used for a sectarian purpose because the parties did not dispute the fact that the
funds could be spent only on educational expenses, a secular purpose.118 In addition, the Court rejected the argument that the State’s control over the funds
caused the funds to retain their public identity, resulting in the use of public funds
for a sectarian purpose.119 Since the funds belonged to the parents, the conditions
imposed on the parents’ use of the funds and the State’s oversight of the accounts
did not interfere with the private nature of the funds.120 Accordingly, the Court
concluded that the ESA program on its face was not appropriation of public funds
for sectarian purposes and, therefore, did not violate the no-aid clause.
3.   Article XI, Section 6
Finally, the Court in Schwartz v. Lopez determined whether the legislature
lawfully funded ESAs under the education-first clause in Article XI, Section 6
of the Nevada Constitution.121 Section 6 requires the legislature to provide funding for the “support and maintenance of [the State’s] university and common
schools . . . by direct legislative appropriation from the general fund . . . .”122 In
addition, the education-first clause prescribes the manner and timeline by which
the legislature shall pass education funding, including the requirement that the
Legislature “fund the operation of the public schools in the State for kindergarten
through grade 12 . . . before any other appropriation is enacted.”123 Last, Section
115

Schwartz, 382 P3d. at 899.
Id. 899–900.
117
Id. at 900.
118
Id. at 899.
119
Id.
120
Id.
121
Id. at 900.
122
NEV. CONST. art. XI, § 6(1).
123
NEV. CONST art. XI, § 6(2). Subsections (3) and (4) pertain to appropriations enacted during
special sessions of the Legislature and are thus inapplicable here. This provision of Section 6
was added in response to legislative gridlock over increasing revenue for education that occurred in 2003. See, e.g., Jeffrey W. Stempel, The Most Rational Branch: Guinn v. Legislature
and the Judiciary’s Role as Helpful Arbiter of Conflict, 4 NEV. L.J. 518, 518 n.2 (2004); Guinn
v. Legislature, 76 P.3d 22, 25–29 (2003); see DEAN HELLER, SEC’Y OF STATE, STATEWIDE
BALLOT QUESTIONS 4 (2004), https://www.leg.state.nv.us/Division/Research/VoteNV/BallotQuestions/2004.pdf [https://perma.cc/GSN5-N5Y6] (arguing in favor of the amendment because “[t]he budget deadlock [Nevada] experienced during the 2003 legislative sessions must
never be repeated.”).
116
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6 renders void any appropriation not enacted in accordance with the section.124
The Lopez plaintiffs argued that S.B. 302’s language requiring that ESA funding
come from the State’s Distributive School Account impermissibly diverted public school funding for private expenditures in violation of Section 6.125 The State
Treasurer argued that S.B. 302 did not violate any provision of Section 6 because
it was not an appropriations bill and also contended that S.B. 515, the bill that
funded the public school system, simultaneously funded ESAs because it was
passed with the “full knowledge” of S.B. 302.126 The Court did not confront either of these arguments head-on but instead endeavored to determine whether
either S.B. 302 or S.B. 515 contained an appropriation for ESAs.127
Article IV, Section 19 of the Nevada Constitution provides that “[n]o money
shall be drawn from the treasury but in consequence of appropriations made by
law.”128 The Court acknowledged that “[n]o technical words are necessary to
constitute an appropriation” and that “one could argue that S.B. 302 impliedly
appropriates funds.”129 However, the Court rejected the State’s argument that
S.B. 302 impliedly appropriates funds because S.B. 302 did not limit the number
of ESAs or the amount of money for ESAs.130 In addition, because the legislature
funded education after the passage of S.B. 302, the funding of the ESAs through
S.B. 302 would have occurred before the funding of the public schools in violation of the education-first clause, rendering the S.B. 302 appropriation void.131
Further, the Court rejected the State’s argument that S.B. 515 simultaneously
funded the ESA program.132 The Court could not infer such a funding appropriation for three reasons: (1) S.B. 515 did not reference the ESA program; (2) S.B.
515 did not appropriate any funds to the ESA program; and (3) the legislative
history of S.B. 515 contained no mention of the ESA program.133 The Court concluded that allowing the use of funds appropriated by S.B. 515 would infringe
upon the legislature’s duties to education under Article XI, Sections 2 and 6.134
Thus, the Court entered a declaratory judgment and permanent injunction upon

124

NEV. CONST. art. XI, § 6(5) (“Any appropriation of money enacted in violation of subsection 2, 3 or 4 is void.”).
125
See Respondents’ Answering Brief, supra note 92, at 20–21; see also S.B. 302, 2015 Leg.,
78th Sess. § 16.1 (Nev. 2015).
126
See Appellant’s Opening Brief at 30–31, Schwartz v. Lopez, 382 P.3d 886 (Nev. 2016)
(No. 69611).
127
Schwartz, 382 P.3d at 900–01.
128
NEV CONST. art. IV, § 19; Schwartz, 382 P.3d at 900.
129
Schwartz, 382 P.3d at 900–01.
130
Id. at 901.
131
Id.
132
Id. at 901–02.
133
Id. at 902.
134
Id.
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the use of any funds appropriated to the public school system by S.B. 515135 under Section 16 of S.B. 302 in both the Lopez and Duncan cases.136 The Court did
not reach the merits of whether S.B. 302 violated other provisions of Article XI,
Section 6.137
4.   Dissent
Justices Douglas and Cherry concurred in all but part VI of the Court’s opinion.138 In their dissent, the Justices disagreed with the majority’s decision on the
merits of the constitutionality of S.B. 302 under the no-aid clause for two reasons.139 First, the invalidation of the funding mechanism made it unnecessary to
make a decision as to whether the legislation violated Section 10, and, second,
the decision was not ripe for a decision on the merits.140 The dissent differed with
the majority’s decision under the no-aid clause because the constitutional question was not procedurally before the Court in that the case was before the Court
on a motion to dismiss.141 Therefore, the only issue to be decided was “whether,
accepting all factual allegations as true, the complaint alleged a claim upon which
relief may be granted.”142 Since the majority seemed to recognize that the plaintiffs put forth a “legally sufficient claim,” the analysis should have ended there.143
Further, the dissent contends that the evaluation of whether the funds were public
or private in nature involved “factual determinations that were not made by the

135

Id. at 902–03 (“Having determined that SB 515 did not appropriate any funds for the education savings accounts, the use of any money appropriated in [S.B.] 515 for K-12 public
education to instead fund the education savings accounts contravenes the requirements in Article 11, Section 2 and Section 6 and must be permanently enjoined. . . . Additionally, because
SB 302 does not provide an independent basis to appropriate money from the State General
Fund and no other appropriation appears to exist, the education savings account program is
without an appropriation to support its operation.”); see also S.B. 302, 2015 Leg., 78th Sess.
§ 16 (Nev. 2015).
136
Schwartz, 382 P.3d at 902–03 (“In Duncan v. Nevada State Treasurer, Docket No. 70648,
we affirm in part and reverse in part the district court’s order dismissing the complaint and
remand the case to the district court to enter a final declaratory judgment and permanent injunction enjoining enforcement of Section 16 of SB 302 absent appropriation therefor consistent with this opinion. In Schwartz v. Lopez, Docket No. 69611, we affirm in part and reverse in part the district court’s order granting a preliminary injunction, and we remand the
case to the district court to enter a final declaratory judgment and permanent injunction enjoining enforcement of Section 16 of SB 302 consistent with this opinion.”).
137
Id. at 902.
138
Id. at 903 (Douglas, J. and Cherry, J. concurring in part and dissenting in part).
139
Id.
140
Id.
141
Id.
142
Id.
143
Id.
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district court. . . .”144 Therefore, the dissent concluded that the Court should have
remanded the case to the district court for factual determinations.145
5.   Holding
In sum, the Court held that S.B. 302 did not facially violate Article XI, Sections 2 or 10 of the Nevada Constitution.146 However, S.B. 302 had attempted to
fund its operation by diverting funds that were expressly appropriated toward the
operation of public schools.147 Nevada Revised Statutes generally prohibits using
any money specifically appropriated for the operation of public schools for any
other purpose,148 but S.B. 302 attempted to exempt itself from this prohibition in
order to divert funds from overall education funding to ESAs.149 The Court
rightly refused to infer such an appropriation for two reasons. First, S.B. 302 was
passed before S.B. 515—the legislation that funded education in the State of Nevada—and thus, any implied appropriation within S.B. 302 would have blatantly
violated Section 6’s education-first clause mandating that public education be
funded first.150 Second, if S.B. 515 had funded both public education and ESAs,
with no limitations on the number of ESAs or a maximum sum of money designated, the program could potentially allow all students to leave the school district, which would directly contravene the legislature’s duties under Article XI,
Section 2.151 Thus, the Court permanently enjoined the funding of ESAs through
the State’s public education budget.152

144

Id.
Id.
146
Id. at 891.
147
S.B. 302, 2015 Leg., 78th Sess. § 15.9 (Nev. 2015); see also discussion supra Part II.C.
148
Prior to the passage of S.B. 302, NRS § 387.045 read, “No portion of the public school
funds or of the money specially appropriated for the purpose of public schools shall be devoted
to any other object or purpose.” NEV. REV. STAT. § 387.045(1) (2013). Although, the Court
does not explicitly point out this issue, the Court does acknowledge that “one could argue that
SB 302 impliedly appropriates funds . . .” likely referring to this provision. Schwartz, 382 P.3d
at 901. Therefore, this point was undoubtedly persuasive to the Court in holding that S.B. 302
did not create a permissible appropriation.
149
S.B. 302 § 15.9.
150
NEV. CONST. art. XI, § 6(2); Schwartz, 382 P.3d at 901.
151
Schwartz, 382 P.3d at 901. (“Because of the ‘hold-harmless’ provision under NRS
387.1223(3), which allows a school district’s DSA funding to be based on enrollment from
the prior year if enrollment in that particular district decreases by five percent or more from
one year to the next, if all students left the public school system, the State must still fund both
the school districts’ per pupil amount based on 95 percent of the prior year’s enrollment and
the education savings accounts for all students, an amount potentially double the $2 billion
appropriated in SB 515 for just the public schools.”).
152
Id. at 903.
145
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III.   ANALYSIS
Through its permanent injunction, the Court essentially gutted the ESAs and
left a shell of a program that had no permissible funding mechanism.153 So if the
program is defunct, why are proponents of ESAs also hailing victory? The reason
is that the opinion declares the ESA program does not facially violate Sections 2
and 10. Proponents claim that the holding makes it “crystal clear that [universal]
ESAs are constitutional” and has, at least in Nevada, “affirmed the lawfulness of
transferring public monies into private education institutions . . . .”154 On the
other hand, opponents contend universal ESAs are dead because changing the
funding mechanism would necessarily change the “universal” nature of the program.155 The following segments will analyze the Court’s holding on the uniformity clause and the no-aid clause in depth and will determine whether the
Court truly upheld the universal nature of the program as well as whether the
Court’s opinion affirms the lawfulness of transferring public monies to private
religious institutions in the name of education.
A.   Analysis of the Court’s Opinion under Article XI, Section 2, the
Uniformity Clause
In upholding the facial validity of S.B. 302 under Article XI, Section 2, the
Court interpreted the uniformity clause as applying only to the public school system.156 The Court stated that because plaintiffs did not disagree that “Nevada’s
public school system is uniform, free of charge, and open to all to students,” and
because ESAs had not altered the existence of the public school system or transformed private schools into public schools, S.B. 302 did not violate the uniformity clause.157 In the course of litigation, the plaintiffs in both cases had presented substantial evidence that S.B. 302 publicly subsidizes non-uniform
private schools, and that the legislation does not require participating entities to
accept all students; thus, the schools are free to deny students admission based
on religion, academic achievement, disability, or sexual orientation.158 However,
153

Schoenmann, supra note 18; Chereb, supra note 17.
Taylor, supra note 20.
155
Schoenmann, supra note 18 (stating that striking down the open-ended funding mechanism
hit the heart of the program, and, thus, the universal program can no longer go forward); Nevada Supreme Court Decision Permanently Blocks Use of School Funds to Pay for Vouchers,
EDUCATE NEV. NOW, Oct. 3, 2016, http://us13.campaign-archive1.com/?u=ce989d91d7a0
0d2638ee2dbd6&id=6d83204b55 [https://perma.cc/F4LP-2PFF] (“To implement the ESA
voucher program, the Nevada Legislature will have to find over $40 million, for this academic
year, to pay for it.”).
156
Schwartz, 382 P.3d at 896 (“Looking to the plain language of Section 2, it is clearly directed
at maintaining uniformity within the public school system.”).
157
Id. at 896.
158
See Respondents’ Answering Brief, supra note 92, at 39; S.B. 302, 2015 Leg., 78th Sess.
§ 14 (Nev. 2015) (“[N]othing in the provisions of sections 2 to 15, inclusive, of this act, shall
be deemed to limit the independence or autonomy of a participating entity. . . .”).
154
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this evidence focused on the non-uniformity of the private school system. In addition, while the Duncan plaintiffs argued in the lower court that the ESA program violates Section 2’s uniformity and general attendance requirements because of the potential loss of funding to the public schools, the lower court held
that the Duncan plaintiffs did not have standing on these issues.159 Therefore, the
lower court was “not bound to accept factual allegations for which the plaintiff
does not have standing to assert to establish a cause of action.”160 The factual
record establishing these claims was not properly before the Nevada Supreme
Court, so in the end the Court did not review these claims.161
The Court’s holding regarding Section 2 was quite narrow because the analysis did not address the universal nature of the program’s impact on uniformity
within public schools nor the impact of private school discrimination upon public
schools. In fact, later in the opinion, the Court acknowledged that the unlimited
nature of the program could potentially allow all students to leave the school
district, resulting in a violation of the uniformity clause. The Court stated,
“[S]urely the Legislature would have specified the number of education savings
accounts or set a maximum sum of money to fund those accounts . . . .”162 Thus,
the Court recognized that while the program in and of itself does not facially
violate the text of Section 2, the unlimited nature of the program does because
“the use of any money appropriated in [S.B.] 515 for K-12 public education to
instead fund the education savings accounts contravenes the requirements in Article 11, Section 2 . . . .”163 In sum, when reading the opinion as a whole, the
Court’s holding under the uniformity clause should be narrowly construed. The
holding in essence provides that taking public money that is not already appropriated to public schools and using it for educational purposes does not facially
violate Article XI, Section 2 of the Nevada Constitution.164 Thus, this Article
posits that if the ESA program is funded in the future, the Schwartz opinion
should not be interpreted to limit any challenge under Section 2.

159

See Order on Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Jurisdiction and Failure to State
a Claim, supra note 68, at 7–8.
160
See Id. at 3 (first citing Doe v. Bryan, 728 P.2d 443, 444 (Nev. 1986); and then citing
Blanding v. City of Las Vegas, 280 P. 644, 650 (Nev. 1929)).
161
See generally Schwartz, 382 P.3d 886.
162
Id. at 901 (“Because of the ‘hold-harmless’ provision under NRS 387.1223(3), which allows a school district’s DSA funding to be based on enrollment from the prior year if enrollment in that particular district decreases by five percent or more from one year to the next, if
all students left the public school system, the State must still fund both the school districts’ per
pupil amount based on 95 percent of the prior year’s enrollment and the education savings
accounts for all students, an amount potentially double the $2 billion appropriated in SB 515
for just the public schools.”).
163
Id. at 902.
164
Id. at 898–99.
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B.   Analysis of the Court’s opinion under Article XI, Section 10, the no-aid
clause
With regard to this part of the Court’s analysis, it is important to note that
this portion of the opinion was decided four-two.165 Justices Douglas and Cherry
dissented under an analysis of the no-aid clause for two reasons. First, the majority’s “holding that the funding of the education savings accounts must be permanently enjoined as unconstitutional makes it unnecessary for [the Court] to
consider whether certain portions of [S.B.] 302 also violate Section 10.”166 Second, the issue was not ripe for a decision on the merits because it was before
the Court on a motion to dismiss, and thus, it should have been remanded to the
district court for factual determinations.167 Therefore, this Article contends that
the no-aid clause analysis portion of the opinion is dicta and, thus, not binding
on future program challenges.168
1.   The Court’s holding that there was no permissible appropriation for
education savings accounts renders the no-aid-clause issue moot.
A claim is moot if there is no actual controversy that can be solved by an
enforceable judgment, and “a controversy must be present through all stages of
the proceeding . . . even though a case may present a live controversy at its beginning, subsequent events may render the case moot.”169 As Justices Douglas
and Cherry point out in their dissent, “our holding that the funding of the education savings accounts must be permanently enjoined as unconstitutional makes it
unnecessary for us to consider whether certain portions of [S.B.] 302 also violate
Section 10.”170 As discussed above, the Court held that any appropriation intended by S.B. 302 or S.B. 515 would violate Sections 2 and 6, rendering the
appropriation void.171 Accordingly, the Court prohibited the State from directing
any funds appropriated by S.B. 515 to ESAs, as it would infringe upon the legislature’s duties with respect to education under Article XI, Sections 2 and 6.172
Because this holding permanently enjoined the funding of ESAs under the existing version of S.B. 302, no public money could ever be disbursed to parents or
165

Id. at 903 (Douglas, J. and Cherry, J. concurring in part and dissenting in part) (“I concur
in all but Part VI of the court’s opinion.”).
166
Id.
167
Id.
168
In Nevada, a statement in a case is dictum when it is “unnecessary to a determination of
the questions involved.” Argentena Consol. Mining Co. v. Jolley Urga Wirth Woodbury &
Standish, 216 P.3d 779, 785 (Nev. 2009) (internal quotations omitted).
169
Personhood Nevada v. Bristol, 245 P.3d 572, 574 (Nev. 2010).
170
Schwartz, 382 P.3d at 903 (Douglas, J. and Cherry, J. concurring in part and dissenting in
part) (“Constitutional questions should not be decided except when absolutely necessary to
properly dispose of the particular case.”) (quoting Cortes v. State, 260 P.3d 184, 192 (Nev.
2011)).
171
Id. at 902.
172
Id. at 902–03.
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sectarian institutions. With no permissible public funding mechanism for the
ESAs, the issue of whether S.B. 302 was an unconstitutional appropriation of
public funds for a sectarian purpose was no longer a live controversy. Therefore,
it was unnecessary for the Court to consider whether S.B. 302 impermissibly
disbursed public monies to sectarian institutions under the no-aid clause because
this issue was moot.
2.   This issue was before the Court on a motion to dismiss, and, thus, the
constitutional merits of the claim should have been remanded to the
lower court to develop a factual record.
In upholding ESAs, the majority acknowledged that these cases come before
the Court from different procedural contexts, with the Duncan case dismissed for
failure to state a claim and the Lopez case upon appeal of a lower court’s granting
of a preliminary injunction.173 Yet, the majority justifies its opinion on the merits
of Section 10 because in both cases “the district court rendered a decision as to
the constitutionality of SB 302, which is purely a legal question reviewed de
novo by this court.”174 Justices Cherry and Douglas declared in their dissent:
[T]he court ignores that the Duncan complaint (which raised the Section 10 challenge) was dismissed by the district court for failure to state a claim under NRCP
12(b)(5). At that stage of the litigation, the only issue to be considered is whether,
accepting all factual allegations as true, the complaint alleged a claim upon which
relief may be granted.175

The dissent relies upon Buzz Stew, LLC v. City of North Las Vegas176 for its
above proposition. In Buzz Stew, the Court reviewed a district court’s dismissal
of the plaintiff’s complaint under NRCP 12(b)(5) and noted that such a dismissal

173

Id. at 895 (“Initially, we note that these cases come before us in different procedural contexts—one from an order granting a preliminary injunction and the other from an order dismissing a complaint for failure to state a claim. Consequently, these proceedings would ordinarily be governed by different standards.”).
174
Id. (“[T]his court reviews de novo determinations of whether a statute is constitutional.”)
(quoting Hernandez v. Bennett-Haron, 287 P.3d 305, 310 (Nev. 2012)). The majority cites
Hernandez v. Bennett-Haron for this proposition. However, in Hernandez the district court
had issued its Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Judgment, denying the Hernandez
plaintiffs’ Motions for Preliminary Injunction and their claim for permanent injunctive relief,
which the plaintiffs appealed. Appellants’ Opening Brief at 5–6, Hernandez v. Bennett-Haron,
287 P.3d 305 (Nev. 2012) (No. 59861). Distinguishable from Hernandez, in Duncan the constitutional challenge of S.B. 302 under Section 10, Article XI was before the Court on a motion
to dismiss for failure to state a claim. See Order on Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss for Lack
of Jurisdiction and Failure to State a Claim, supra note 68, at 44–45 (holding that “[t]his Court
concludes Plaintiffs have not alleged facts establishing its claim that the Legislature’s creation
of the ESA program violates Article XI, section 10, prohibiting the use of public funds for a
sectarian purpose. Plaintiffs’ claim is dismissed.”).
175
Schwartz, 382 P.3d at 903 (citing Buzz Stew, LLC v. City of N. Las Vegas, 181 P.3d 670
(Nev. 2008)).
176
Buzz Stew, LLC. v. City of N. Las Vegas, 181 P.3d 670 (Nev. 2008).
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“is subject to a rigorous standard of review on appeal. . . . [Plaintiff’s] complaint
should be dismissed only if it appears beyond a doubt that it could prove no set
of facts, which, if true, would entitle it to relief.”177 However, the Schwartz majority did not address whether plaintiffs could or could not have proven any set
of facts which, if true, would entitle them to relief.178 Instead, the Court concluded as a matter of law that the “ESA program does not result in any public
funds being used for sectarian purpose and thus does not violate Article 11, Section 10 of the Nevada Constitution.”179 This is problematic because as the dissent
points out, “the issue as to whether the funds in the education savings accounts
are private or public in nature involves factual determinations that were not made
by the district court and should not be made by this court in the first instance.”180
The majority’s holding on Section 10 departs from other states’ procedural
jurisprudence in that virtually all other courts consider a similar question of
law—for example, high courts in Arizona,181 Ohio,182 Wisconsin,183 Colorado,184
177

Id. at 672 (internal quotations omitted).
See generally Schwartz, 382 P.3d at 886.
179
Id. at 900.
180
Id. at 903 (Douglas, J. and Cherry, J. concurring in part and dissenting in part).
181
For example, in Cain v. Horne, the Arizona Supreme Court reversed a summary judgment
finding that “as enacted, the State’s school voucher programs do not result in an appropriation
of public money for . . . the support of any religious establishment in violation of Article 2,
Section 12 of the Arizona State Constitution. Cain v. Horne, 183 P.3d 1269, 1275 (Ariz. Ct.
App. 2008), rev’d, 202 P.3d 1178 (Ariz. 2009) (internal quotations omitted); Cain v. Horne,
202 P.3d 1178, 1185 (Ariz. 2009); see also Minute Entry at 2, Cain v. Horne, No. CV 2007002986 (Ariz. Super. Ct. June 14, 2007), 2007 WL 1891530, at *1 (“Having read and considered the parties’ motions, supporting memoranda and statements of facts, the Court has determined (i) that there are no issues of fact material to this proceeding in dispute and this matter
is a matter of law for the Court and (ii) that the defendants’ reasoning and authorities are
correct and applicable.”). In Niehaus v. Huppenthal, the Arizona Supreme Court affirmed a
lower court’s finding after a trial on the merits that the voucher program did not violate the
aid and religion clauses of the Arizona Constitution. Niehaus v. Huppenthal, 310 P.3d 983,
987–89 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2013).
182
In Simmons-Harris v. Goff, the matter was before the court of appeals on a motion for
summary judgment, and the Ohio Supreme Court reversed a court of appeals declaration that
a school voucher program was unconstitutional under Article VI, Section 2. Simmons-Harris
v. Goff, 711 N.E.2d 203, 212, 216 (Ohio 1999); see also OHIO CONST. art. VI, § 2 (stating that
“no religious or other sect, or sects, shall ever have any exclusive right to, or control of, any
part of the school funds of this state.”).
183
In Jackson v. Benson, the Wisconsin Supreme Court reversed a court of appeals decision
affirming a lower court’s granting of summary judgment holding that modifications to an existing voucher program were unconstitutional. Jackson v. Benson, 578 N.W.2d 602, 632 (Wis.
1998); see also Jackson v. Benson, 570 N.W.2d 407, 416, 427 (Wis. Ct. App. 1997), rev’d 578
N.W.2d 602 (Wis. 1998) (focusing on whether the aid provided by the amended program was
“for the benefit of” religious institutions as the clause of the Wisconsin constitution in question
provides: “nor shall any money be drawn from the treasury for the benefit of religious societies, or religious or theological seminaries.” WIS. CONST. art. I, § 18).
184
The plurality in Taxpayers for Pub. Educ. v. Douglas Cty. Sch. Dist. held after trial and
appellate decision on the merits that the Colorado State Constitution prohibits public funds
178
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New Mexico,185 and Florida186—have made their determinations on consideration of an order granting summary judgment or upon a decision after trial on the
merits.187 By contrast, the Court here concluded, with limited to no factual determinations, that “[o]nce the public funds are deposited into an education savings
account, the funds are no longer ‘public funds’ but are instead the private funds
of the individual parent who established the account.”188 The Court reasoned that
“[t]he parent decides where to spend the money for the child’s education and
may choose from a variety of participating entities, including religious and nonreligious schools.”189 Additionally, the majority rejects the argument that the
funds never lost their public identity without addressing the mechanics of how
the public funds reached parents or how they reached private religious institutions.190 When you contrast the Schwartz majority’s reasoning with how other
states have analyzed school choice programs’ constitutionality on similar claims,
the analysis on the funding mechanism and whether the funds were ever truly
private is approached with great attention to detail. In the states mentioned above,
final determinations of fact had been made at the trial level. This allows appellate-level courts to conduct a thoughtful and thorough analysis of the mechanisms by which school choice programs are funded and how they are interpreted
against their own constitutional limitation on the expenditure of public monies
for sectarian purposes.191
from being given directly to students for use at religious schools. Taxpayers for Pub. Educ. v.
Douglas Cty. Sch. Dist., 351 P.3d 461, 475 (Colo. 2015).
185
The New Mexico Supreme Court reversed a motion for summary judgment in Moses v.
Skandera, holding that the New Mexico state constitution prohibits public funds from being
used to buy textbooks for students attending private schools. Moses v. Skandera, 367 P.3d
838, 849 (N.M. 2015) petition for cert. filed, 84 U.S.L.W. 3657 (U.S. May 16, 2016) (No. 151409).
186
Finally, in Bush v. Holmes, the Florida Supreme Court reviewing an appeal after a trial
court’s decision on the merits held that “a program through which the State pays tuition for
certain students to attend private schools, is declared to be unconstitutional on its face . . . .”
Bush v. Holmes, 886 So. 2d 340, 345 (Fla. Dist. App. 2004), aff’d in part, 919 So. 2d 392 (Fla.
2006).
187
See Cain v. Horne, 202 P.3d 1178, 1181 (Ariz. 2009); Niehaus v. Huppenthal, 310 P.3d
983, 985 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2013); Simmons-Harris, 711 N.E.2d at 206; Jackson, 578 N.W.2d at
607; Bush, 886 So. 2d at 345; Chittenden Town Sch. Dist. v. Dep’t of Educ., 738 A.2d 539,
539 (Vt. 1999) (finding that sectarian school tuition reimbursement program was unconstitutional because it lacked safeguards against the use of funds for religious purposes).
188
Schwartz v. Lopez, 382 P.3d 886, 899 (Nev. 2016).
189
Id.
190
Id. Although plaintiffs proffered multiple examples of how the funds remain within the
State’s control, the court was not persuaded, concluding that this control did change the private
character of the funds. Id.
191
See Cain, 202 P.3d at 1181; Niehaus, 310 P.3d at 984–85; Jackson, 578 N.W.2d at 621(after thorough analysis of the program’s function in practice holding that “public funds may be
placed at the disposal of third parties so long as the program on its face is neutral between
sectarian and nonsectarian alternatives and the transmission of funds is guided by the independent decisions of third parties.”); Stewart & Walker, supra note 31, at 44 (citing Bush, 886
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An excellent example of this is illustrated by Arizona courts’ differing opinions on school choice programs passed by its state legislature in the cases of Cain
v. Horne192 and Niehaus v. Huppenthal.193 In these two cases, Arizona courts
reached different conclusions because of how the programs in effect operated as
a distribution of public monies. For example, in Cain, the court analyzed two
programs ordained by the Arizona legislature that allowed students with disabilities to receive state funding to attend a private school.194 Under these two programs, a parent of a qualifying student, after applying and being accepted, would
receive a check which must be restrictively endorsed to the private school of their
choice.195 The Arizona constitutional provision at issue is referred to as the “aid
clause,” and it prohibits “appropriation of public money made in aid of any . . .
private or sectarian school . . . .”196 After a thorough analysis of the legislative
history and relevant case law interpreting these constitutional provisions,197 the
Arizona Supreme Court then looked to the funding mechanism and held that,
unlike its previous holdings, the funds here were appropriations.198 The court
next looked to where the appropriations were going and who they benefited.199
The State in Cain argued that the parents exercise their own discretion in choosing where the money goes.200 However, the Arizona Supreme Court held that the
programs were unconstitutional because there were no limitations on what the
funds could be used for and the programs directly transferred public money to
private schools in violation of the aid clause.201 Even though the checks were first
given to the parents, that fact was irrelevant because once a student was accepted
into a qualified school, the parents did not have a choice and were forced to endorse the check over to the school.202
Four years after the Cain decision, in Niehaus v. Huppenthal,203 the Arizona
Court of Appeals analyzed another school choice program passed by the Arizona
So. 2d at 347) (holding that the voucher program violated the State Constitution’s “no aid
provision” because it was “undisputed that the OSP use[d] state revenues to fund vouchers
that are paid to private schools chosen by the parents or guardians of students” and finding
that because the voucher was used to pay the cost of tuition, any disbursement made to a
religious school is made in aid of a “ ‘sectarian institution,’ regardless if the voucher funds or
supports a church or religious Denomination”) (internal quotations omitted); Id. at 45 (citing
Bush, 886 So. 2d at 352–53).
192
Cain, 202 P.3d at 1180–81.
193
Compare Cain, 202 P.3d at 1181 with Niehaus, 310 P.3d at 984.
194
Cain, 202 P.3d at 1180–81.
195
Id.
196
ARIZ. CONST. art. IX, § 10; Cain, 202 P.3d at 1184 (internal quotations omitted).
197
Cain, 202 P.3d at 1182–83.
198
Id. at 1184.
199
Id.
200
Id. at 1182.
201
Id. at 1183–84; see also Stewart & Walker, supra note 31, at 41.
202
Cain, 202 P.3d at 1184.
203
310 P.3d 983 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2013).
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legislature for certain students with disabilities.204 However, in Niehaus, unlike
in Cain, the funding for the program was subject to certain restrictions, such as
the requirement that students must receive education in “reading, grammar,
mathematics, social studies and science” and the requirement that parents agree
“[n]ot [to] enroll the qualified student in the school district or charter school and
release the school district from all obligations to educate the qualified student.”205
After fulfilling these requirements, the parent could then use the funds toward
one or more of eleven permissible uses.206 The aid clause in question “prohibits
the appropriation of public money to private or sectarian schools.”207 The court
focused its analysis on the “specified object” of the appropriation and held that
the object of the program was to benefit families rather than sectarian schools.208
In addition, the court distinguished this program from the program at issue in
Cain because the funds were allowed to go toward several uses, not just tuition,
depending on the parent’s choice.209 Therefore, the court held that the program
was constitutional under Arizona’s comparable no-aid clause.210
This distinction as to how the money was spent is quite subtle, and the court
in each case reached its conclusion only after thorough analysis of the programs’
funding distribution mechanisms. Here, unlike the courts in Arizona, the Nevada
Supreme Court did not analyze the funding distribution mechanisms in order to
determine whether the public nature of the funds ever truly transitioned to private
funds.211 Instead, the Court addressed and rejected the arguments that the funds
remained public because the State Treasurer chooses the financial firm where the
funds are held, can audit, freeze, or dissolve the accounts, and the unused funds
revert back to the State General Fund.212 The Court did not address, and the factual record may not have identified, the mechanisms by which the private schools
received funds or the distribution mechanisms by which the parents chose to
spend the funds.
Indeed, it is still unknown how the program would work in practice; however, the Nevada Treasurer provided handbooks for both parents and participating entities, articulating how they should work.213 The legislation directs the parent to open the ESA, and the Treasurer to deposit the money.214 According to the
Nevada State Treasurer’s “Participating Entity Handbook,” a participating entity
204

Id. at 984.
Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
206
Id. at 984–85.
207
Id. at 987.
208
Id. (citing League of Ariz. Cities and Towns v. Martin, 201 P.3d 517, 521 (Ariz. 2009)).
209
Id. at 987–88.
210
Id. at 989.
211
See generally Schwartz v. Lopez, 382 P.3d 886, 902 (Nev. 2016).
212
Id. at 899.
213
See generally ESA PARTICIPATING ENTITY HANDBOOK, supra note 47; ESA PARENT
HANDBOOK, supra note 26.
214
See discussion supra Part I.B.
205
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receives payment through the Nevada State Treasurer’s web portal.215 Additionally, for other expenses, such as fees for computer labs, registration, or graduation, parents must pay costs upfront and then apply for reimbursement through
the Nevada State Treasurer’s web portal from the child’s ESA.216 The Treasurer’s
Parent Handbook explains that “[f]ees are not always as straightforward as tuition . . . . For this reason, fees that are not included in the overall tuition amount
must be paid for by the parent and then submitted through the web portal for staff
to review for potential reimbursement.”217
Like in Cain and Niehaus, here, the parents choose which qualifying private
entity receives the funds. But the program was struck in Cain because parents
were required to turn over the money directly to the institution; similar arguments
could be made for the Nevada ESA program. For example, like in Cain where
the parents were required to restrictively endorse the check to the qualifying institution, parents here are only allowed to disburse the money in the account directly to the institution. Additionally, Nevada’s ESA program requires State approval of the purchase before the parent can be reimbursed for the expense, this
is distinguishable from Niehaus, where account funds were accessed by parents
through a pre-loaded debit card and parents were required to retain receipts to
ensure funds were spent on approved purchases,218 whereas Nevada’s program
requires State approval of the item before the parent can be reimbursed for the
expense.219 Thus, an argument could be made that by requiring State approval
for reimbursement, the State’s action actually supersedes the parent’s decision
when determining whether paying the cost is an appropriate use of State funds.
If the use is determined to be sectarian in nature, the expenditure being approved
by the State could be in violation of Article XI, Section 10 of the Nevada Constitution.
On the other hand, parallels can be drawn between the Nevada ESAs and the
program upheld in Niehaus. For example, Nevada’s ESA funds are also allowed
to go toward several uses, not just tuition, depending on the parents’ choice.220
In addition, similar to the program in Niehaus, where the students were required
to receive education in reading, grammar, math, social studies, and science, Nevada’s ESA program requires students to take all required math, English, and
language arts examinations.221 Further, like Niehaus where the parents were pro-

215

ESA PARTICIPATING ENTITY HANDBOOK, supra note 47, at 15.
Id.
217
ESA PARENT HANDBOOK, supra note 26, at 8.
218
James Paul, Education Savings Accounts Policy Brief, COMMONWEALTH FOUND. (Apr. 11,
2016), http://www.commonwealthfoundation.org/issues/detail/give-children-the-best-education-savings-accounts [https://perma.cc/2QG6-8VS6].
219
See discussion supra Part I.B.
220
Id.
221
S.B. 302, 2015 Leg., 78th Sess. § 12 (Nev. 2015).
216
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hibited from enrolling the student in the school district or a charter school, Nevada’s ESA program requires students to dis-enroll from public school at least
one day before the funds are deposited.222 The Arizona Supreme Court used all
these facts to distinguish the programs in Niehaus and Cain, and, thus, an argument could be made that that the ESA program is constitutional under Nevada’s
Constitution for these reasons.223 Yet this type of detailed analysis was not apart
of the Schwartz opinion and the Court did not reference Cain or Niehaus in its
reasoning.
While the comparable section in Arizona’s Constitution is not worded the
same as Nevada’s,224 and Arizona precedent is certainly not binding on Nevada’s
courts, these cases illustrate the fine distinctions courts often make on this type
of constitutional question. This Article offers this analysis not to argue that the
Nevada Supreme Court should have reached an alternative conclusion, but rather
to show how a different conclusion could have been reached. Whether these facts
would have made a difference in the Court’s opinion is unknown because the
case was before the Court on a motion to dismiss, with the plaintiffs not having
an opportunity to conduct discovery to present all relevant facts before the Court.
3.   Since the no-aid clause issue was both moot and not procedurally
before the Court, it must be concluded that the majority opinion under
Section 10 is dicta.
When evaluating what is holding and what is dicta within judicial opinions,
issues of policy, such as constraint and consideration, must be taken into account.225 Constraint limits a court’s holding to the resolution of issues implicated
by meaningfully presented material case facts.226 “The doctrines of ripeness,
standing, and mootness [while often criticized] are frequently deployed in the
name of judicial constraint . . . .”227 Consideration refers to the consideration only
of issues properly before the court.228 While judges should hesitate to create new
law absent sufficient opportunity to present all relevant facts and law,229 dicta
often serves a valuable purpose. For instance, it can clarify a complicated subject,

222

See ESA PARENT HANDBOOK, supra note 26, at 7–8.
See discussion supra Part III.B.2. (discussing Niehaus v. Huppenthal, 310 P.3d 983, 984–
89 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2013)).
224
Compare NEV. CONST. art. XI, § 10 with ARIZ. CONST. art. IX, § 10.
225
Michael Abramowicz & Maxwell Stearns, Defining Dicta, 57 STAN. L. REV. 953, 1017
(2005).
226
Id. at 1018–21.
227
Id. at 1018.
228
Id. at 1021.
229
Id. at 1022.
223
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aid other courts in their reasoning, and assist lawyers and the community to predict results. However, its distinction from a holding is frequently disregarded,230
and it is important to distinguish the court’s holding in Schwartz from dicta because of the doctrine of stare decisis.231 It is through the doctrine of stare decisis
that courts use opinions not just to resolve cases but also to make common law,
which can be both binding and persuasive to other courts.232 When judges deciding future cases accept dicta as if it were binding law, they fail to deliberate and
decide based on the appropriate question of law.233
In Nevada, a statement in a case is dicta when it is “unnecessary to a determination of the questions involved.”234 In Schwartz, the validity of ESAs under
Article XI, Section 10 of the Nevada Constitution appeared before the Court only
after a lower court granted a motion to dismiss, and, thus, the merits of that issue
were not before the Court for consideration.235 In addition, the Court permanently
enjoined the funding of ESAs,236 meaning that a finding of whether the funds
were public or private in nature was not necessary to determine the constitutionality of the program because there was no constitutional funding mechanism. The
Court had before it important issues of constitutional law that should be resolved
only if implicated by meaningfully presented material case facts, and the Court
should exercise constraint in making its determinations. Therefore, because the
program’s constitutionality under Section 10 was not properly before the Court
and also because the issue was rendered moot by the Court’s holding under Article XI, Section 6, it must be concluded that the majority’s opinion as to Section
10 is dicta. Consequently, while the majority’s reasoning may be persuasive
precedent in the future, it should not be considered binding on future Section 10
claims.

230

Pierre N. Leval, Madison Lecture, Judging Under the Constitution: Dicta About Dicta, 81
N.Y.U. L. REV. 1249, 1250, 1253 (2006).
231
Abramowicz & Stearns, supra note 225, at 995 (“[S]tare decisis encourages a process of
judicial decisionmaking in which holdings are motivated by the need to resolve cases rather
than by the desire to further judicial preferences concerning legal policy. It does so by encouraging judges to rely upon a set of material facts that emerge from the case before them in their
effort to explain the basis for their selected judgment.”); see also Leval, supra note 230, at
1250 (“The problem is that dicta no longer have the insignificance they deserve. They are no
longer ignored. Judges do more than put faith in them; they are often treated as binding law.
The distinction between dictum and holding is more and more frequently disregarded.”).
232
Leval, supra note 230, at 1258 (“This rule [stare decisis] requires that once a court has
decided a case based on a proposition of law, the court must thereafter adhere to that proposition of law, deciding like cases in like manner (unless it takes the rare step of disavowing and
overruling the proposition)”).
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CONCLUSION
As initially created, Nevada’s ESAs were the most aggressive school choice
measure in the nation. However, the Nevada Supreme Court recognized that
there was inherent danger to the future sustainability of the public school system
by allowing all of Nevada’s students to participate in the ESA program. In sum,
the Nevada Supreme Court held that using money explicitly set aside for K-12
public education for ESAs was unconstitutional, leaving the program without a
mechanism to fund its operation.237 Additionally, the Court narrowly interpreted
Article XI, Sections 1 and 2 of the Nevada Constitution as an endorsement upon
the legislature’s ability to enact programs which encourage education “as long
as the Legislature maintains a uniform public school system, open and available
to all students . . . .”238 However, any claim that this decision approves of ESAs
as a permissible method for the legislature to fulfill its duty to provide for a uniform school system is misguided.239 The legislature still has duty to maintain a
uniform system of public schools, and this opinion emphasizes that responsibility.240 Further, while the Court indicated a willingness to be persuaded by an argument that public monies allocated to individual parents for educational purposes was permissible under the Nevada Constitution, the Court did not directly
hold that transferring public monies to private education institutions is lawful.241
Whether the ESA program is a constitutional appropriation of public funds is still
an issue to be decided upon material facts when ripe for consideration.
Therefore, if the ESA program is to successfully continue, it will require a
finite source of funding, thereby limiting the number of students able to participate and the program’s universal nature.242 With the recently regained Democratic control of the Nevada Legislature in the general election of 2016, the funding of ESAs in 2017 and 2018 will be a tough sell.243 For example, during
Governor Sandoval’s State of the State address on January 17, 2017, the Governor announced his proposal of $60 million for ESAs in the State’s budget.244 In
the Democratic response, Senate Majority Leader Aaron Ford stated that the
funding allocation for ESAs “is the wrong priority for Nevada’s kids” and that
any amount of money allocated to ESAs would “result in LESS money being
237
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239
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240
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241
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242
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243
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[https://perma.cc/XQ7Z-MFYT].
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made available to public schools.”245 If the ESAs are to receive any funding, the
budget line item will have to pass both the Nevada Senate and Assembly in order
to make it to Governor Sandoval’s desk. Repeal of ESAs is equally unlikely, as
the Governor would probably veto such legislation. Therefore, the fate of Nevada’s ESAs is in limbo. While the program is not dead, it does not look like it
will be resuscitated in the near future.
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